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Lifecycle theories of mergers and diversification predict that firms make acquisitions and diversify
when their internal growth opportunities become exhausted. Free cash flow theories make similar
predictions. In contrast to these theories, we find that the acquisition rate of firms (defined as the number
of acquisitions in an IPO cohort-year divided by the number of firms in that cohort-year) follows a
u-shape through their lifecycle as public firms, with young and mature firms being equally acquisitive
but more so than middle-aged firms. Firms that go public during the merger/IPO wave of the 1990s
are significantly more acquisitive early in their public life than firms that go public at other times.
Young public firms have a lower acquisition rate of public firms than mature firms, but the opposite
is true for acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries. Strikingly, firms diversify early in their life
and there is a 41% chance that a firm’s first acquisition is a diversifying acquisition. The stock market
reacts more favorably to acquisitions by young firms than to acquisitions by mature firms except for
acquisitions of public firms paid for with stock. There is no evidence that the market reacts more adversely
to diversifying acquisitions by young firms than to other acquisitions.
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Existing theories of firms going public and of acquisitions offer a rich set of hypotheses concerning 
the role of acquisitions during a firm’s lifecycle. The first hypothesis is that firms go public when they 
have good internal investment opportunities, so that we would expect young firms to focus on organic 
growth rather than growth through acquisitions. With this hypothesis, the acquisition rate should increase 
over time. The second hypothesis is that firms make acquisitions, especially diversifying acquisitions, 
when they have exhausted their internal growth opportunities, so that we expect mature firms to be more 
active in acquisitions than young firms and this effect should be stronger for diversifying acquisitions. 
The third hypothesis is that corporate acquisitions are just another form of investment, so that firms that 
invest a lot make a lot of acquisitions. With this hypothesis, firms should make more acquisitions early in 
their life because young firms grow faster.
1 Fourth, to the extent that public firms can make acquisitions 
on better terms, perhaps because they can finance them more cheaply or because they can use their stock 
as a currency, we would observe a spike in acquisitions early in the life of firms because they would have 
postponed making acquisitions until they went public. Finally, if firms go public because the market 
overvalues them, this would lead them to make more stock acquisitions. In this paper, we examine key 
predictions of these different theories of the role of corporate acquisitions in the lifecycle of firms.  
After excluding the firms that do not meet our data requirements, we have a sample of 6,548 firms 
that IPO from 1975 to 2002. We then follow these firms through time as long as they are listed, so that we 
can estimate the extent to which corporations make acquisitions at various stages of their lifecycle as 
public firms. The predictions of the theories we consider are predictions for the lifecycle of firms and, 
therefore, they should hold irrespective of the market conditions when firms go public. If we were to 
focus mostly on firm-year data, we would be giving most weight to IPOs in the years when the market is 
the most active, so that our results might just reflect the acquisition activity of firms that go public in the 
hottest markets. To avoid this problem, most of our analysis focuses on event years, where we define an 
event year as the year from the IPO, and average event-years across IPO cohorts.     
                                                 
1 See Clementi (2002) for a review of the evidence. 3 
 
When we measure acquisition activity by the conditional acquisition rate for an event year, which we 
define as the ratio of the number of acquisitions for the firms in a cohort’s event year divided by the 
number of firms from that cohort alive at the beginning of the event year averaged across IPO cohorts, we 
find that firms are most active in the corporate acquisition market in the year following their IPO. From 
the IPO onward, the conditional acquisition rate follows a u-shape, so that it is higher when firms are 
young (first three years after IPO) and when they are mature (more than ten years since IPO). While the 
conditional acquisition rate of young firms does not differ from the conditional acquisition rate of mature 
firms, young firms acquire fewer public firms than mature firms. However, irrespective of a firm’s age, 
acquisitions of public firms represent a small minority of the acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that acquisitions and internal investment are complementary for young public firms. It is 
not supportive of the hypothesis that firms are most active in the market for acquisitions when their 
internal growth opportunities have shrunk. Further, there is no difference between young and mature 
firms in the extent to which they engage in diversifying acquisitions. There is therefore no support for 
theories that predict that firms diversify in their maturity when they have exhausted their internal growth 
opportunities.  
There is a considerable literature that emphasizes the role of market conditions on a firm’s decision to 
go public (for a review, see Ritter and Welch (2002)). According to that literature, firms are more likely 
to go public when valuations are high. As a result, there is clustering in going public decisions. We find 
that whether a firm goes public in a hot or a cold IPO market has no implications for how its propensity to 
make acquisitions changes as it ages. However, young firms acquire more relative to mature firms during 
the hot merger market of the 1990s. It is therefore not surprising that firms that IPOed in the 1980s 
typically have their highest acquisition rate later in life in contrast to firms that IPOed in the 1990s that 
have their highest acquisition rate in the first full calendar year of their life.  
We examine more directly the spike in acquisitions that takes place in the first year after the IPO. We 
find that it is a spike in acquisitions of private firms, not public firms. Further, the spike in acquisitions is 
driven by cash acquisitions rather than stock acquisitions. There is no significant spike in equity-financed 4 
 
acquisitions, so that the hypothesis that firms go public because of overvaluation and use their overvalued 
equity to make acquisitions is not supported. The acquisition spike is not concentrated in acquisitions 
within  the  acquirer’s  industry  as  there  is  a  similar  spike  across  diversifying  and  non-diversifying 
acquisitions.  
With our approach, we focus on the conditional acquisition rate of firms of a given age as public 
firms.  We  examine,  however,  whether  our  results  also  hold  if  we  use  a  different  measure  of  the 
conditional acquisition rate, namely the total value of deals by firms of a given age divided by the assets 
held by firms of that age. This measure, which we call the conditional dollar acquisition rate, suffers from 
the problem that the value of the deal is unavailable for a large fraction of the deals. We find that firms 
spend more on acquisitions early in life, but this result is driven by the merger wave of the 1990s. If we 
exclude firms that are young during that merger wave, there is no difference between the spending on 
acquisitions for young and mature firms. When we compare the conditional dollar acquisition rate for 
young and mature firms, we find that young firms make more acquisitions of private firms and more 
related acquisitions than mature firms. Strikingly, the conditional dollar acquisition rate for diversifying 
acquisitions  is  not  significantly  different  from  the  conditional  dollar  acquisition  rate  of  related 
acquisitions for young or for mature firms. Finally, we also find that IPO firms with poor first-day returns 
experience more of a drop in acquisitions later in life than other IPO firms. 
Throughout the paper we focus on the lifecycle of firms as public firms.  An obvious issue with this 
approach is that our results might be due to firms that are young relative to their incorporation and young 
firms make more acquisitions. With this view, it would not make sense to start our analysis at the IPO and 
the role of the IPO in our analysis would be spurious.  We examine this possibility by dividing firms at 
the IPO into age quintiles relative to incorporation. The spike at year one we document holds irrespective 
of the age relative to incorporation at the IPO. Similarly, we also find that young and mature firms have 
similar acquisition rates irrespective of the age since incorporation of firms when they go public. While 
the IPO firms that belong to the lowest quintile of age since incorporation acquire more when young than 
when mature, this result is completely driven by the IPO cohorts from 1995 to 2000.  5 
 
Our  evidence  seems  inconsistent  with  the  view  that  firms  make  acquisitions  when  they  have 
exhausted  internal  growth  opportunities.  However,  it  could  still  be  the  case  that  mature  firms  make 
acquisitions for that motive while young firms do not. To the extent that an acquisition announcement 
conveys  information  about  a  firm’s  growth  opportunities  when  the  firm  is  older  but  not  when  it  is 
younger, we would expect a more adverse reaction to acquisitions by older firms. The literature has used 
this argument to explain the adverse stock-price reaction for the announcement of acquisitions of public 
firms paid for with equity (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)). We find that, except for 
acquisitions of public firms paid for with equity, the stock-price reaction is more positive for younger 
firms. Lastly, the worst stock-price reaction occurs for acquisitions of public firms in the same industry 
paid for with stock. There is no difference in the stock-price reaction between such acquisitions made by 
young firms and made by mature firms.  
The existing evidence shows that it is plausible that a reason for firms to go public is that it gives 
them  an  advantage in  making  corporate  acquisitions  as  suggested  by  Lyandres,  Zhdanov,  and  Hsieh 
(2008). However, the precise nature of this advantage is unclear. While the literature has focused on the 
acquisition rate, the post-IPO spike exists only for acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries. The 
absence of a post-IPO spike for acquisitions of public firms requires a theory of the post-IPO acquisition 
spike that explains why young public firms have an advantage in acquiring private firms but not public 
firms. Further, as already discussed, IPO firms use cash to pay for acquisitions more than they use equity. 
The neo-classical view of acquisitions is that they reallocate corporate assets to more productive uses. 
In this vein, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) develop a q-theory of investment. In their theory, investment 
can  take  place  through  capital  expenditures  as  well  as  through  acquisitions.  High  q  firms  make 
acquisitions because they have greater productivity that they can transfer to the acquired firm. Younger 
firms have higher qs as they go public. With this theory, we would therefore expect IPO firms to be active 
in the acquisition market. This theory does not explain, however, why the acquisition rate does not appear 
to differ between young and mature firms on average, why there is an initial IPO spike, and why this 
spike is focused on acquisitions of private companies.  6 
 
A different literature focuses on the role of misvaluation in acquisition decisions by firms. With this 
literature, firms with high qs are more likely to be overvalued. Firms could time their IPOs to when the 
market is likely to overvalue them and engage in acquisitions using their overvalued equity. In particular, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) provide a model of acquisitions made by overvalued firms and empirical 
papers  find  evidence  for  a  role  of  overvaluation  in  acquisition  decisions  and  outcomes  (e.g.,  Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)). However, 
we find that, for the acquisitions where the method of payment is known, more acquisitions are paid for 
with cash than with stock for both young and mature firms.  
There is a  large  literature  on  the  benefits  and costs  of  corporate  diversification.  In  neo-classical 
models, firms diversify when they have unique resources that can be applied to projects in different 
industries and when their prospects in their industry are no better than in another industry that they 
diversify into (see, for instance, Gomes and Livdan (2004), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Matsusaka 
(2001)). Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) provide tests that are supportive of this perspective. In their 
model, more efficient firms acquire assets and conglomerates sell their less productive assets following 
demand shocks in the industry of these assets. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find support for these 
ideas in a study of the market for corporate assets. If firms that undergo an IPO are more efficient firms, 
the existence of a spike in acquisitions would be consistent with their model. Their data source includes 
both  private  and  public firms.  For  their  approach  to  explain  our results,  public  firms  should  have  a 
productivity advantage over private firms since we find that young public firms have a much higher 
acquisition rate for private firms than they do for public firms. The model of Clementi (2002) could 
explain such an outcome. In that model, firms are capital-constrained and go public following a favorable 
productivity shock to raise more capital. In Gomes and Livdan (2004), firms diversify to take advantage 
of  economies  of  scope  and  because  “diversification  allows  a  mature,  slow-growing  firm  to  explore 
attractive new productive opportunities.” Their model predicts that firms whose activities have a lower 
rate of return diversify. Such firms are not generally viewed to be firms that just had an IPO. 7 
 
Alternatively, agency  models also suggest that firms  make diversifying acquisitions to maximize 
managerial rents when they have poor prospects in their industry (see, for instance, Jensen (1993)), but 
for such firms, acquisitions are not efficient. With these types of explanations for diversification, we 
would expect firms to make diversifying acquisitions later in their life since we would expect firms that 
go public to have good prospects. The evidence we uncover that firms make diversifying acquisitions 
throughout their life and that the rate at which they make such acquisitions does not appear to change 
much through their life seems to create a challenge for such models. 
Other papers examine the extent to which young firms make acquisitions and find that young firms 
are extremely active and, even though our focus and approaches differ, our paper builds on these earlier 
contributions. In an important contribution, Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) show that firms are 
very active acquirers immediately after their IPO using a sample of IPOs from 1985 to 2004. They find 
young firms to be more active in acquisitions than firms that are more than 5 years from their IPO. In 
contrast to them, we focus on the whole lifecycle of firms and investigate theories that pertain more to 
mature firms. Consequently, our focus is on a comparison of young firms to firms that are more than 10 
years from their IPO. This focus leads us to have a different sample from theirs. First, we have IPOs since 
1975. Such a sample allows us to track acquisitions for firms that are more than ten years from their IPO 
for twenty-one years. Second, we include all IPOs while they use IPOs with proceeds greater than $100 
million in 2004 dollars. A sample restricted to IPOs with proceeds greater than $100 million would be a 
much smaller sample, so that earlier cohorts would be too thin when the firms reach maturity. More 
fundamentally, our approach differs from theirs in that we focus on cohort evidence rather than firm-level 
evidence.  This  is  because  our  focus  is  on  lifecycle  predictions  and  these  predictions  should  hold 
irrespective of when a firm IPOs, so that they should hold across cohorts. We can then test separately 
whether IPO and merger market conditions at the time of a cohort goes public affect the behavior of firms 
in that cohort over their lifecycle. Lyandres, Zhdanov, and Hsieh (2008) use a much longer sample to 
show the rate of acquisition of IPOs and how it relates to merger waves. The fact that they find that high 8 
 
IPO intensity precedes merger waves suggests that the high acquisition intensity of IPO firms may be 
related to the degree of activity in the M&A merger market. Our evidence shows that this is the case. 
Alimov and Mikkelson (2008) examine the investment behavior of firms that go public in favorable 
market  conditions  (defined  as  conditions  where  there  is  a  high  rate  of  firms  going  public  and  high 
valuations). They find that firms that IPO in these conditions tend to spend more on acquisitions. To the 
extent that high valuations are associated with an active merger market, our results would be consistent 
with theirs even though the conditions of the IPO market do not appear sufficient by themselves to predict 
the intensity of acquisition activity by IPO firms.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the construction of our sample of IPOs and 
of the acquisitions made by these firms. In Section 3, we show evidence on the rate of acquisition of firms 
as a function of their age. In Section 4, we examine in more detail the acquisition rate of young firms and 
contrast the acquisition behavior of firms immediately after their IPO to the acquisition behavior of more 
mature firms. In Section 5, we analyze the abnormal returns associated with acquisitions for young and 
mature firms. We conclude in Section 6.  
 
2. Sample construction and description 
In this section, we describe how we construct our sample of IPOs and then how we obtain our sample 
of acquisitions made by the IPO firms. The population of firms and their deals are obtained using the 
SDC database maintained by Thompson Financial Database. The IPO sample includes 6,816 original US 
common stock offerings from 1975 to 2002, excluding unit issues, spinoffs, privatizations, reverse LBOs, 
rights issues, ADRs, closed funds and trusts, and REITs. 6,548 firms out of the 6,816 IPOs have unique 
PERM numbers, which allow us to get the data on stock prices from the CRSP database. By way of 
comparison, Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) have 1,250 IPOs in their dataset from 1985 to 2004 
that have proceeds greater than $100 million in 2004 dollars. Our sample of IPOs is mostly the same as 
the sample made available by Professor Ritter on his website. The major exception is that we include all 9 
 
industries in the sample used for the results reported in the tables, while he excludes regulated industries. 
We will also discuss results that exclude these industries. 
Table 1 shows our sample of 6,548 IPO firms. It is not surprising in light of the existing evidence on 
IPOs that the number of IPOs varies substantially over time. As expected, we have a large number of 
IPOs in the second half of the 1990s. The period from January 1995 to December 2000 has 38.58% of our 
IPOs. Further, underpricing is highest in 1999 and 2000. There is a high attrition rate for the firms in our 
sample. Except for the IPOs since 1997, there is no IPO cohort that has a survival rate greater than 30% to 
the end of the sample period. For the IPO cohorts in the first ten years of the sample, all of them have a 
survival rate equal to or lower than 20%.  
Through most of the paper, we focus on acquisition transactions where a firm attempts to acquire 
another firm, whether public or private, or a subsidiary of another firm, but we also discuss results for a 
sample of completed acquisitions.
2 The measure involving acquisition attempts may be a better measure 
of acquisitive activity by a firm since it measures actions under its control where it aims to acquire 
another firm. The measure involving completed acquisitions is a better measure of how a firm changes as 
a  result  of  acquisitions.  Acquisitions  of  private  firms  and  subsidiaries are  almost  always  completed. 
Consequently, a focus on acquisition attempts may bias the results towards a higher acquisition rate for 
mature  firms  since  these  firms  focus  more  on  acquiring  public  firms,  which  have  a  lower  rate  of 
completion. The sample of completed acquisitions is constructed as follows. We first eliminate all deals 
where  we  cannot  ascertain  that  the  acquirer  owns  less  than  50%  of  the  acquired  firm  before  the 
acquisition announcement. Within this subset of acquisitions, we then keep only the acquisitions where 
we can ascertain that the acquirer owns 100% of the acquired firm after the acquisition. We call this 
sample the sample of completed acquisitions.   
Acquisition transactions for these 6,548 firms are obtained from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions 
database. Data on acquisitions is sparse before 1981. Therefore, we include only acquisitions announced 
from  1981  through  2006.  We  exclude  repurchases,  recapitalizations,  and  self-tenders.  We  include 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we use the term subsidiary acquisition to denote the acquisition of a subsidiary, division, or a branch. 10 
 
acquisitions  made  by  all  IPO  firms  in  our  sample.  Proceeding  this  way,  we  do  not  have  data  on 
acquisitions by IPOs before 1981 in the early years of these firms, but we have data on firms that are 
more than twenty-one years from their IPO that we would not have otherwise. A large number, 4,776, of 
6,548 firms (73%) that had their IPO in the period from 1975 to 2002 engaged in at least one merger or 
acquisition  transaction  in  1981-2006.
3  These  4,776  firms  had  a  total  of  28,476  transactions  with  an 
average of 5.96 deals per firm, while 1,772 firms had no transaction recorded in this comprehensive 
database. SDC has information about acquisitions by the IPO firms that took place before these firms 
went public. We do not use that information in the following because it is not comprehensive. However, 
1% of firms announced an acquisition on the same day as their IPO and we use that information.  
 
3. The acquisition rate through the firm’s lifecycle 
In this section, we investigate the conditional acquisition rate of firms through their lifecycle. Table 2 
reports the conditional acquisition rate for each IPO cohort in event years, where the IPO is year 0. The 
conditional acquisition rate is defined as the number of acquisitions by firms from a cohort in an event 
year divided by the number of firms in that cohort that have survived until the beginning of that event 
year. It is therefore the average number of acquisitions per firm in a cohort in a fiscal year. We call this 
statistic the conditional acquisition rate in the remainder of the paper. In the table, year 0 is a partial year.  
Table 2 shows the mean and median conditional acquisition rates for each year in the lifetime of a 
firm from year 0 to year 25. We cut off the early cohorts at year 25 because there are too few firms in 
each cohort after that year. Firms make acquisitions steadily through their life. No cohort with an IPO 
after 1978 has a year without acquisitions. The peak mean conditional acquisition rate is in year 1, the 
first full calendar year that a firm is public. The two highest median conditional acquisition rates are 0.58 
in year 1 and 0.59 in year 22. The highest year 1 conditional acquisition rate is 1.87 for the 1997 cohort. 
Five cohorts have an average conditional acquisition rate that exceeds one in year 1. All these cohorts are 
in the second half of the 1990s when the M&A market was extremely active.  
                                                 
3 The SDC database for M&A transactions starts in 1979. 11 
 
In Table 2, we show the year for each cohort when it has its highest conditional acquisition rate. The 
table shows a striking change in the peak year of the conditional acquisition rate. The cohorts in the 1970s 
and the 1980s have a peak acquisition rate in later years of their life. Until 1990, all peak year conditional 
acquisition rates are after year 5.  All but two are in year 10 or later. After 1991, all cohorts have a peak 
conditional acquisition year before year 4 and almost all (9 out of 11) have a peak conditional acquisition 
rate year in year 1. The phenomenon of unusually high acquisitive activity by new firms is therefore one 
that holds for the 1990s but not earlier. It is well-known, however, that characteristics of IPO firms 
changed in the 1990s, in that new public firms were less well-established than they were earlier (see Fama 
and  French  (2004)).  In  particular,  firms  that  went  public  before  the  1990s  were  more  likely  to  be 
profitable when they went public. Another important consideration is that the firms that went public in the 
1990s faced a hot M&A market in their youth. We investigate the relevance of this last consideration in 
the next sub-section. 
Looking at the evolution of the mean conditional acquisition rate after year 1, we see that it falls after 
year 1, reaching a minimum of 0.34 in year 5, and then increases again, so that the conditional acquisition 
rate of firms after year ten is more like the conditional acquisition rate of young firms than the conditional 
acquisition rate of firms in years 5 to 10. This pattern holds as well when we consider the median 
conditional acquisition rate. It follows from these observations that the conditional acquisition rate of 
firms through their lifecycle follows a u-shape pattern. It is high in a firm’s youth, lower in its middle age, 
and  high  again  when  it  reaches  maturity.  Our  regression  analysis  in  the  next  section  finds  that  the 
conditional acquisition rate is significantly lower during these event years. Figure 1 shows the conditional 
acquisition rates in each event year for each IPO cohort. Though we do not reproduce the results in a 
table, we reach similar conclusions when we consider the sample of completed acquisitions.  
So far, we have focused on the number of acquisitions made by IPO firms. The same number of 
acquisitions at different stages of a firm’s life could have very different implications if in one event year 
the acquisitions are small and in the other they are large. Ideally, therefore, we would also examine the 
amounts spent on acquisitions by firms during their lifecycle. As already explained, however, SDC does 12 
 
not report the consideration paid for a large fraction of acquisitions. For the acquisitions used in Table 2, 
the acquisition consideration is not available for 48.32% of the acquisitions. Nevertheless, we report 
results for the amount spent on acquisitions as a fraction of the assets owned by firms in a cohort at the 
beginning of the year in Table 3. To account for deals with no information, we construct the ratio using 
only the firms for which information on acquisition consideration is available for each acquisition they 
make  and  for  which  total  assets  is  available  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  We  call  this  statistic  the 
conditional dollar acquisition rate. The rate is unbiased if the rate for the firms with incomplete or no 
information is the same as the rate for the firms with full information. Because we exclude firms that 
make acquisitions for which we do not have deal size information, some cohort years drop out in Table 3, 
so that the average for some event years involves fewer cohorts than in Table 2.  
In Table 3, the mean conditional dollar acquisition rate is highest in year 2. The median conditional 
dollar acquisition rate is highest in year 1 and never reaches again a rate half as a high as that rate after 
year 8. The mean conditional dollar acquisition rate is higher for young firms, but there are some years 
where older firms have a conditional dollar acquisition rate that is close to the mean of year 1. It is useful 
to  note,  however,  that  the  high  values of the dollar  acquisition rate  in  years 1  and  2 are  driven  by 
extremely high conditional dollar acquisition rates in the second half of the 1990s. For instance, when we 
consider year 1, the peak conditional dollar acquisition rate is in 1999 and is more than three times the 
average. Similar results hold when we analyze the sample of completed acquisitions.    
Though we do not report the results in a table, we also investigate the dollar amount spent by firms in 
a cohort at the firm level. Given that a firm makes acquisitions for which the consideration is known, the 
lifecycle pattern is similar for the median to the pattern for the cohort results of Table 3. The mean of the 
cohort medians exhibits more volatility, but it has more a u-shape pattern than the monotone declining 
pattern of the median.   
Tables 2 and 3 show that no case can be made that mature firms are more acquisitive than young 
firms. Both tables show that firms on average have peak conditional acquisition rates early in life, but the 
exact timing of the peak is slightly different between the two tables. However, while there is a clear u-13 
 
shape pattern for the acquisition rate, the dollar acquisition rate is more variable, but is more consistent 
with a monotone decreasing rate through the firm’s lifecycle. Though we do not reproduce the results in a 
table, all the conclusions we reach from the data in Tables 2 and 3 hold up if we restrict the sample to 
exclude financial firms and utilities.  
Another way to investigate the acquisitive behavior of new firms is to look at the time that they make 
their first acquisition. We compute (but do not report in a table) the fraction of firms in a cohort that have 
their first acquisition in a given event year. We call this ratio the first-deal acquisition ratio. We find that 
the peak year of the first-deal acquisition ratio has changed over time. In the earlier years of our sample, 
the peak year of first deal acquisitions is later in the life of firms. After 1988, for all years but one, the 
peak year is year 1. On average, 27% of IPO firms have their first acquisition in year 1 and 58% of IPO 
firms  have  made  an  acquisition  by  the  end  of  year  2.  Surprisingly,  42%  of  first  acquisitions  are 
diversifying acquisitions.  
 
4. An examination of the acquisition rate of young and mature firms  
In this section, we first compare the acquisition behavior of young and mature firms. Throughout the 
paper we call young firms those firms that are in the first three complete calendar years after their IPO, 
and mature firms those that are in years 10 to 20 from their IPO. We also estimate multiple regression 
models that investigate the determinants of the conditional acquisition rate of young, middle-aged, and 
mature firms. In the second part of this section, we explore in greater detail the nature of the acquisition 
spike in year one. Finally, we investigate whether the results are explained by differences in the age since 
incorporation of firms that go public. Though we primarily focus on the conditional acquisition rate, we 
also report results for the conditional dollar acquisition rate as well. Throughout the section, we discuss 





4.1. Comparing the conditional acquisition rate of young and mature firms    
We now compare in Table 4 the conditional acquisition rate of young firms and mature firms. We 
construct the average conditional acquisition rate for young and mature firms by averaging across cohorts 
for an event year and then averaging across event years. Table 4 has results for the whole sample as well 
as for the sample of completed acquisitions.  
There is no significant difference in the average conditional acquisition rate of young firms and the 
average conditional acquisition rate of mature firms. It is common in the IPO literature to distinguish 
between hot and cold IPO markets. The literature has a number of different ways to make that distinction. 
We use the approach of Helwege and Liang (2004). To define hot and cold IPO markets, they use the 
three-month moving average of the number of IPOs scaled by new business formations for each month. 
They define the top quartile of that measure to correspond to hot IPO months and the bottom tercile to 
correspond to cold IPO months. There is no difference in the acquisition activity between firms that go 
public in hot IPO markets versus firms that go public in cold IPO markets.  
We consider next the relation between underpricing and the acquisition rate. If greater underpricing 
means that firms are more favored by the market, firms with more underpricing should command more 
resources and hence be able to carry out more acquisitions. Alternatively, if greater underpricing means 
that a firm received too little cash for its IPO, then we should see the opposite result. We show results for 
the conditional acquisition rate for quintiles of first-day returns, where the quintiles are computed within 
cohorts. We see that for both samples there is no difference in the acquisition rate between the various 
quintiles of first-day returns for young firms. However, there is some evidence that firms that have the 
lowest  IPO  first-day  returns  are  less  acquisitive  when  they  become  mature.  Further,  the  conditional 
acquisition rate falls significantly for the firms in the lowest quintile of first-day returns, but not for the 
firms in the other quintiles. We also re-calculated the quintiles without dividing the sample into IPO 
cohorts and the results are qualitatively the same. To evaluate the relation between the level of mergers 
and acquisitions activity in the economy and the conditional acquisition rate of the IPO cohorts, we 
consider separately the merger/IPO wave years of the 1990s and the other years. We date the merger/IPO 15 
 
wave from 1995, the year of the Netscape IPO, to 2000, the year of the collapse of the internet boom. We 
see  that  the  difference  between  the  conditional  acquisition  rate  of  young  firms  and  mature  firms  is 
dramatic for the 1990s merger/IPO wave years. However, there is no difference between these conditional 
acquisition rates when these years are excluded. Further, the rate of acquisition activity of young firms is 
much higher during the 1990s merger/IPO wave years than in other years. There is no difference in these 
results between the sample of all acquisitions and the sample of completed acquisitions.  
Figures 2 and 3 provide further importance on the importance of merger activity for the acquisitive 
behavior of IPO firms. In Figure 2, we plot the mean conditional acquisition rate per event year for the 
whole sample, for the event years during the merger/IPO wave of the 1990s, for the other years, as well as 
for whether a firm goes public in a hot or cold IPO market. Figure 3 shows the medians instead. It is 
extremely clear from these plots that there is a sharp difference in the acquisitive behavior of firms early 
in their public life if the market for acquisitions is very active or not.  
Turning to the characteristics of the acquisitions, we first estimate a conditional acquisition rate for 
acquisitions in the firm’s two-digit SIC code industry, which we call related acquisitions, as well as a 
conditional acquisition rate for other acquisitions, which we call diversifying acquisitions. We find that 
there is no difference in the extent to which mature firms make diversifying acquisitions compared to 
young firms. However, there is a significant difference in the extent to which mature firms make public 
acquisitions as mature firms make more public acquisitions than young firms. The fraction of acquisitions 
that are private firm acquisitions is lower for mature firms than for young firms. In contrast, mature firms 
acquire more subsidiaries than young firms. It is clear from the data presented about the organizational 
form of the target that acquisitions of public firms are a small minority of all acquisitions. Lastly, we 
consider how the acquisition is paid for. Young firms have a higher rate of acquisitions paid for with 
stock  than  mature  firms.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  the  fraction  of  acquisitions  that  are  in  cash  is 
significantly higher for mature firms. It is important, however, not to forget that data on how acquisitions 
are paid for is missing for a majority of acquisitions. We investigate, but do not report in the table, 
whether the results for how acquisitions are paid for differ depending on whether a firm goes public in a 16 
 
hot IPO market or a cold IPO market. We find that the proportion of acquisitions that are paid for with 
stock is significantly higher for firms that go public in a hot IPO market than for firms that go public in a 
cold IPO market.  
We turn next to a comparison of the conditional dollar acquisition rate. We show the results in Table 
5. The sample used for this table excludes all deals of firms with at least one missing transaction value. As 
for Table 4, we show results for all acquisitions and then for completed acquisitions only. There is no 
significant difference in the conditional dollar acquisition rate between young and mature firms for the 
whole sample, but there is a significant difference for the sample of completed acquisitions. Using the 
sample of completed acquisitions, mature firms spend less on acquisitions than young firms. However, 
young firms that go public in a hot market have a higher conditional acquisition rate than young firms that 
go public in a cold market. Further, the greater expenditure on acquisitions of young firms occurs only for 
young firms that go public in a hot market for the sample of completed acquisitions. We consider next the 
conditional  dollar  acquisition  rate  for  the  quintiles  of  first-day  returns.  As  with  the  results  for  the 
conditional acquisition rate, we see that firms that have the lowest first-day return experience a stark drop 
in their conditional dollar acquisition rate when they mature. Finally, we again split the sample into the 
merger/IPO wave of the 1990s and the other years. Outside of the merger wave of the 1990s, there is no 
evidence that young firms acquire at a higher rate than mature firms.  
Looking at the extent to which firms undertake diversifying acquisitions, we find that young firms 
spend more than old firms on related acquisitions, but not on diversifying acquisitions. Young firms 
spend  much  more  on  acquisitions  of  private  firms  than  mature  firms.  There  is  no  difference  in  the 
spending  on  acquisitions  of  public  firms  between  young  and  mature  firms.  The  conditional  dollar 
acquisition rate is not significantly different for young and mature firms for different means of payments; 
however, the fraction of acquisitions financed with cash is significantly higher for mature firms than for 
young firms.  
We investigate whether the results discussed so far in this section differ if we restrict the sample to 
exclude financial firms and utilities. There are no meaningful differences between the results.  17 
 
We  now  use  multiple  regressions  to  understand  how  market  characteristics  as  well  as  cohort 
characteristics  affect  cohort  event-year  conditional  acquisition  rates  and  dollar  acquisition  rates.  The 
advantage  of  the  regression  framework  is  that  we  can  evaluate  the  relation  between  conditional 
acquisition rates accounting for the correlations among explanatory variables of interest and that we can 
use continuous explanatory variables.  
Table  6  shows  regression  estimates  using  cohort-event-year  conditional  acquisition  rates  as  the 
dependent  variable.  We  report  results  for  the  whole  sample.  Results  for  the  completed  acquisitions 
subsample are similar. We eliminate all cohort years with less than 20 firms. The first regression has a 
constant and two indicator variables. The indicator variables are one variable for whether the firms in the 
cohort are in the period of 4-9 years (middle-aged firms) after the IPO and one variable for whether the 
firms are more than ten years from their IPO. We use robust standard errors with clustering on IPO 
cohorts. We confirm that the conditional acquisition rate in event time follows a u-shape pattern. The 
intercept, corresponding to the conditional acquisition rate of young firms, is 0.5. The coefficient for 
mature firms is an insignificant -0.04, so that mature firms and young firms have the same conditional 
acquisition rate. However, the coefficient on middle-aged firms is -0.13 and is significant at the 5% level. 
Middle-aged firms are therefore less acquisitive than young and mature firms. We test explicitly for the u-
shape pattern by comparing the acquisition rate of young versus middle-aged firms and middle-aged firms 
versus mature firms. We find significant differences at the 5% consistent with a u-shape.  
The next regression adds an indicator for the hot merger/IPO market of 1995-2000 to regression (1). 
We find that the indicator variable is significant and positive in regression (2), but it does not change the 
inferences from regression (1). Instead of using the indicator variable for the hot merger/IPO market, we 
construct an index of M&A activity. The index is constructed by dividing the total number of acquisitions 
in SDC by the number of active firms in Compustat. That variable, in regression (3), is significant as well. 
However, adding that variable has no impact on the other coefficient estimates. In regression (4), we add 
indicator variables for whether the firm went public in a hot or cold IPO market to regression (2). These 
indicator variables are not significant. In regression (5), we add to regression (2) the lagged M&A index 18 
 
and the mean first-day IPO return for the cohort. Neither of these variables is significant. However, these 
variables affect the coefficients of the first two indicator variables as their absolute value increases and 
the coefficient on mature firms becomes negative and significant. In regression (6), we add to regression 
(2) the variables we introduced in regressions (4) and (5). None of these variables are significant. For 
regression (7), we create an indicator variable for whether the index of M&A activity is above its sample 
average. In the regression, we add that index and interact it with the index for the age of the firm. While 
the index is not significant, there is now evidence that the higher conditional acquisition rate of young 
firms is due to the periods of intense M&A activity. In periods where M&A activity is below average, 
mature  firms  acquire  more.  Regression  (7)  has  marginal  evidence  that  multicollinearity  might  be  a 
problem using the VIF index. Regression (8) is similar to regression (7) except we use an indicator 
variable for the merger/IPO boom of the second half of the 1990s instead of an indicator variable for the 
M&A index being above average. With this specification, multicollinearity is not a problem, but the 
inferences are the same as for regression (7).    
We also estimated regressions like those of Table 6 for the dollar acquisition rate. These results are 
reproduced in Table 7. We find that middle-aged firms and mature firms spend less on acquisitions than 
young  firms  in  regression  (1).  Not surprisingly,  spending  on  acquisitions is much  higher  during  the 
merger wave of the 1990s. Outside of high merger activity periods, young firms do not spend more on 
mergers than more mature firms.   
   
4.2. The conditional acquisition rate of firms up to year 4   
As discussed in Section 3, firms that go public in the 1990s have a spike in the conditional acquisition 
rate in the first year after the IPO. We examine the conditional acquisition rate by year for young firms. 
The intent is to understand how the conditional acquisition rate evolves for young firms as their IPO 
becomes more distant and whether this evolution differs depending on the state of the IPO market and of 
the M&A market.  19 
 
Table 8 reports estimates of the conditional acquisition rate for years 0 to 4 for various subsamples. 
As in Tables 4 and 5, we report results for the whole sample as well as for the sample of completed 
acquisitions. The conditional acquisition rate in year 4 is 56.52% of the year 1 rate. A similar result holds 
for the completed acquisition sample. There is no significant difference in conditional acquisition rates 
between firms that go public in hot and cold markets in any of the first four years of their public life. The 
conditional acquisition rate in year 4 is 51.29% of the year 1 rate for hot market IPOs and 55.95% for cold 
market  IPOs.  However,  the  conditional  acquisition  rate  falls  significantly  from  year  1  to  year  4  for 
acquisitions by firms that had their IPO in a hot market, but not by firms that had an IPO in a cold market.  
The  spike  in  year  1  holds  for  all  quintiles  of  underpricing  for  the  whole  sample,  but  it  is  not 
significant for the first quintile. However, there is no significant difference in acquisition rates between 
the first and fifth quintile. Though we do not report the results in the table, we also investigate conditional 
acquisition rates for quintile of first-day returns computed across all acquisitions. We find similar results. 
Since underpricing varies across hot and cold markets, we investigate (but do not report in the table) the 
relation between underpricing and acquisition activity separately for hot and cold markets. We find no 
statistically significant difference in conditional acquisition rates across underpricing quintiles between 
firms that IPO in hot and cold markets. 
In both samples, the year one spike is dramatic for the merger/IPO wave of the 1990s. The rate of 
acquisition in year one is more than three times higher during the merger/IPO wave.  Not surprisingly, the 
rate of acquisition is significantly higher each year during the merger wave than in other years. Finally, 
the year one acquisition rate is significantly higher during the merger wave but not for the sample that 
excludes the years from the merger wave.   
We  turn  next  to  the  characteristics  of  the  acquisitions  of  young  firms.  We  discussed  in  the 
introduction the literature which suggests that firms make diversifying acquisitions as their investment 
opportunities  disappear  in  their  industry.  There  is  a  spike  in  the  acquisition  rate  of  diversifying 
acquisitions in year 1 as well. In year 1, firms have a conditional acquisition rate of 0.25 outside their 
industry. This rate falls over time so that the acquisition rate outside the industry is 0.16 in year 4. As a 20 
 
proportion of the acquisitions, the fraction of diversifying acquisitions increases from year 1 to year 4, but 
not significantly. 39% of the acquisitions in year 1 are diversifying acquisitions when we use the whole 
sample of acquisitions; by year 4, 44% of the acquisitions are diversifying acquisitions. A similar result 
holds for the sample of completed acquisitions. To further buttress the point that firms make diversifying 
acquisitions early in life, it is striking that 40% of the acquisitions in the year of the IPO are diversifying 
acquisitions.  
We saw earlier that young firms mostly acquire private firms and subsidiaries. For the sample as a 
whole, there is no evidence of a spike in year 1 for acquisitions of public firms. When we compare IPOs 
in hot and cold markets, we find similar results, though there is evidence of a spike in year 1 in the 
acquisition of public firms for IPOs in hot markets (not reported). Over time, acquisitions of public firms 
become more important as a fraction of all acquisitions because the acquisition rate falls for acquisitions 
of private firms and subsidiaries. It follows from this that the year 1 spike in acquisitions is driven by 
acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries.  
Lastly, we investigate the method of payment. When the data is available, cash is used more often 
than equity. However, the stock acquisition rate is not significantly higher in year one than it is in year 4. 
In contrast, the cash acquisition rate is. There is no evidence, therefore, that firms use their stock to pay 
for acquisitions more intensely early on in their life. The acquisition rate for stock acquisitions is 0.09 for 
hot market IPOs in year 1 and is 0.05 for cold market IPOs in the same year. However, the acquisition 
spike is not significant for stock acquisitions whether the firm went public in a hot market or a cold 
market.  
We reproduce our analysis for the acquisition rate using the dollar acquisition rate, but do not show 
the results in a table. The sample is notably smaller, so that our statistical tests have limited power when 
we consider subsamples. There is no evidence of a year one spike with the sample of all acquisitions. In 
fact, the conditional dollar acquisition rate is the same for year 1 and year 4, 0.04. For the same sample, 
we find that the conditional dollar acquisition rate is significantly higher in years 2 and 3 for firms that 
IPO in a hot market than for firms that IPO in a cold market. Further, young firms spend significantly 21 
 
more on acquisitions during the merger/IPO wave of the 1990s than in other years. Though firms make 
diversifying acquisitions early in their life, we find that they spend significantly more on acquisitions in 
their 2-digit SIC code. Finally, the fraction of the amount spent on acquisitions that is spent on private 
firms acquisitions falls significantly from year 1 to year 4, while the fraction of the amount spent on 
public acquisitions increases significantly. Though firms spend more on private firm acquisitions in year 
1 than on public firm acquisitions, the ranking flips already in year 2. However, the differences in these 
fractions are never significant. The results are similar using the sample of completed acquisitions, but the 
significance is typically less as that sample is smaller.  
 
4.3. The influence of the age since incorporation` 
Throughout the paper so far, we have ignored the fact that firms that go public vary in age since 
incorporation. We now divide our IPO firms for which we have the year of incorporation into quintiles 
according to their age since incorporation at the IPO. Panel a of Table 9 shows the median age since 
incorporation for each of the quintiles. There is a surprisingly wide range of age since incorporation for 
the IPO firms. We turn next to an investigation of whether the conditional acquisition rate of firms since 
the IPO depends on the age of incorporation of firms. For that purpose, we show in Panel b of Table 9 the 
conditional rate of young and mature firms relative to their IPO for each of the quintiles of age since 
incorporation. We saw for the sample as a whole in Table 4 that there is no significant difference in the 
conditional acquisition rate of young and mature firms. This result (not tabulated) holds as well for each 
age since incorporation quintile except for the firms in the first quintile. We find evidence significant at 
the 10% level that young firms acquire more than mature firms if they are in the youngest quintile. 
However, this evidence is due entirely to the merger/IPO wave years. The last panel of the table looks at 
the spike in year 1. We find that the spike is significant for all age quintiles since incorporation except for 
the fourth quintile. However, once more, this result (not tabulated) is driven by the merger wave of the 
1990s.   
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5. The market’s reaction to acquisitions by young and mature firms  
In this section, we investigate the stock-price reaction to acquisition announcements by young and 
mature  firms.  If  firms  make  acquisitions  because  of  a  lack  of  growth  opportunities,  we  expect  an 
especially poor reaction to acquisitions by young firms since they just went public partly based on their 
investment opportunities. If young firms make acquisitions to exploit their growth opportunities because 
acquisitions are complementary to capital expenditures, there would be no reason for the market to react 
adversely to acquisitions.  
We estimate abnormal  returns  as  net-of-market  returns over the  window  [-1,+1] around the  first 
announcement date. Such an approach is especially appropriate for young firms since we do not have 
much data to estimate a market model. It is well-known from the literature that announcement returns 
differ  by  the  type  of  target  and  by  the  method  of  payment.
4  In  Table  10,  we  therefore  provide 
announcement return estimates for acquisitions by young and mature firms across all combinations of 
type of target and method of payment. However, only a subset of acquisitions has information on the 
method of payment.  
The  first  panel  of  the  Table  reports  abnormal  returns  for  all  acquisitions.  We  see  that  for  all 
acquisitions, young firms have higher abnormal returns than mature firms. When we consider different 
types  of  targets,  we  see  that  young  firms  have  higher  abnormal  returns  than  mature  firms  for  both 
acquisitions of private targets and acquisitions of subsidiaries. There is no difference in abnormal returns 
between young and mature firms for acquisitions of public firms. When we turn to acquisitions for which 
the method of payment information is available, we have a much smaller sample. The results are provided 
in the next panel of the Table. The results are similar to those of the first panel, but significance is lower.  
We consider separately acquisitions paid for with cash and acquisitions paid for with equity. The 
results are provided in Table 11. Young firms experience higher abnormal returns than mature firms for 
acquisitions paid for with cash. Strikingly, young firms have higher abnormal returns than mature firms 
when they acquire public firms for cash. The same result holds for subsidiaries. However, there is no 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). 23 
 
significant difference for acquisitions of private firms. When we turn to acquisitions paid for with stock, 
we find that for the whole sample of such acquisitions, young firms earn higher abnormal returns than 
mature firms. However, this result does not hold for acquisitions of public firms with stock. For these 
acquisitions, there is no difference for the mean abnormal return and for median young firms have lower 
abnormal returns than mature firms.   
When we use the sample of all acquisitions, we find that young firms have higher abnormal returns 
for most types of acquisitions. The only case where there is any evidence that young firms have worse 
abnormal  returns  than  mature  firms  is  for  acquisitions  of  public  firms  with  stock.  In  that  case,  the 
evidence is present only for medians and not for means. We conduct the same investigation for the sample 
of completed acquisitions and reach similar, but less strong conclusions. We do not reproduce the results 
in a table. When we look at all acquisitions, young firms have significantly higher abnormal returns. This 
is also the case for acquisitions paid for with equity. However, few of the differences for subsamples are 
significant.  Such  an  outcome  might  not  be  surprising  as  the  sample  of  completed  acquisitions  is 
substantially smaller than the sample of all acquisitions.  
In Table 11, we separate acquisitions into diversifying and related acquisitions. To the extent that 
firms  diversify  when  they  have  poor  internal  growth  opportunities,  we  would  expect  diversifying 
acquisitions to signal to the market that a firm does not have good internal growth opportunities. We saw 
that the only acquisitions by young firms to which the market reacts negatively are acquisitions of public 
firms paid for with stock. Strikingly, this result is due to related acquisitions. The market reacts more 
favorably to diversifying acquisitions by young firms paid for with stock than to related acquisitions. In 
contrast, the market reacts more adversely to related acquisitions of public firms paid for with stock than 
it does to diversifying acquisitions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the acquisition behavior of IPO cohorts through their lifecycle. We find 
that the acquisition rate of IPO cohorts follows a u-shape: the acquisition rate is higher when firms are 24 
 
young (their first three complete calendar years) and when they are mature (years ten to twenty) than 
when they are middle-aged (years four to ten). This pattern is heavily influenced by the intensity of 
activity in the acquisition market. During the merger/IPO of 1995 to 2000, young firms were dramatically 
more acquisitive than mature firms. In contrast, in other periods, mature firms are at least as acquisitive as 
young firms. However, young and mature firms differ in the type of acquisitions they make. Young firms 
make more acquisitions of private firms and fewer acquisitions of public firms relative to mature firms. 
Consequently, if one were to focus only on acquisitions of public firms, one would conclude that mature 
firms  are  more  acquisitive  than  young  firms.  Any  theory  that  explains  why  young  firms  are  more 
acquisitive has to explain why this greater acquisition rate translates itself into  more acquisitions of 
private firms than of public firms.  
Theories  of  acquisitions  in  the  lifecycle  of  firms  that  argue  that  firms  become  acquisitive  and 
diversify because they run out of internal growth opportunities are inconsistent with the evidence we 
present. Not only do firms acquire intensely just after they go public, so that their first acquisition is at 
least  as  likely  to  be a  diversifying  acquisition than not, they  even  make  diversifying  acquisitions  at 
roughly the same rate early in their life as they do when they mature. Further, if acquisitions are made 
because internal growth opportunities have vanished, we would expect the market to react adversely to 
acquisitions  by  young  firms  and  especially  diversifying  ones.  However,  we  show  that  the  market 
generally reacts more positively to acquisitions by young firms. The exception to this result is that the 
market reacts poorly to acquisitions of public firms for equity irrespective of whether a firm is young or 
mature  and  reacts  worst  of  all  to  the  acquisition  of  related  public  firms  paid  for  with  equity. 25 
 
Table 1. IPO sample and rate of survival 
IPOs are identified using the SDC Global Issues Database. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, and 
excludes reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisition deals of the IPO 
firms include all acquisitions in the SDC’s M&A database for 1981-2006. Event Year refers to the deal year with respect to the 
IPO year, event year 0. The first three columns provide the IPO year, total number of IPOs in each IPO year, and the percentage 
of new IPOs in each IPO year compared to the total number of IPOs in the sample. IPO proceeds are reported by the SDC Global 
Issues Database and calculated as the total number of shares issued multiplied by the offer price. IPO underpricing is calculated 
as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO 
offer price (e.g. Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). Total Assets ($M) are reported by SDC and are measured before the IPO. All dollar 
values are reported in 2004 dollars using the CPI as a deflator. IPO total assets are available for 4,244 (63%). IPO underpricing is 
calculated for the 6,518 IPOs (out of 6,548) for which data are available. The post-IPO survival rate is calculated as the number 
of firms alive as of January 1
st of the 5
th, 10
th, and 20
th event year over the total number of IPO firms.  The last two columns 
report the total number and percentage of IPO firms that survived until the end of the sample period, January 1st, 2007. 
 
1975 5 0.08% 57.93 4.38 4 80% 3 60% 3 60% 1 20%
1976 32 0.49% 18.43 0.56 27 84% 12 38% 9 28% 4 13%
1977 22 0.34% 12.62 6.63 15 68% 7 32% 5 23% 2 9%
1978 28 0.43% 15.79 19.17 22 79% 16 57% 7 25% 2 7%
1979 52 0.79% 17.43 6.25 48 92% 29 56% 14 27% 8 15%
1980 99 1.51% 11.46 12.50 85 86% 58 59% 21 21% 13 13%
1981 236 3.60% 12.47 3.71 195 83% 119 50% 49 21% 36 15%
1982 82 1.25% 9.79 5.77 59 72% 37 45% 18 22% 13 16%
1983 477 7.28% 18.97 4.03 1.71 387 81% 224 47% 80 17% 59 12%
1984 218 3.33% 10.73 1.47 162 74% 94 43% 36 17% 30 14%
1985 212 3.24% 15.10 3.96 23.70 165 78% 98 46% 31 15% 24 11%
1986 451 6.89% 18.61 2.88 41.62 364 81% 243 54% 86 19% 79 18%
1987 315 4.81% 16.63 2.50 24.44 231 73% 157 50% 51 16% 51 16%
1988 134 2.05% 19.16 2.73 63.07 103 77% 66 49% 31 23%
1989 117 1.79% 24.07 5.00 29.40 96 82% 60 51% 28 24%
1990 103 1.57% 24.28 7.69 24.14 86 83% 54 52% 25 24%
1991 225 3.44% 34.95 9.82 28.85 196 87% 110 49% 66 29%
1992 295 4.51% 30.29 4.84 24.91 236 80% 138 47% 86 29%
1993 434 6.63% 32.29 6.93 35.56 348 80% 177 41% 125 29%
1994 359 5.48% 28.04 4.69 25.24 281 78% 125 35% 86 24%
1995 431 6.58% 37.93 14.88 25.04 283 66% 143 33% 120 28%
1996 641 9.79% 37.56 10.00 19.62 383 60% 179 28% 164 26%
1997 426 6.51% 37.07 9.74 23.24 261 61% 131 31% 131 31%
1998 269 4.11% 40.68 9.09 32.45 165 61% 98 36%
1999 432 6.60% 68.03 38.54 31.29 239 55% 160 37%
2000 327 4.99% 43.88 26.61 64.39 199 61% 155 47%
2001 63 0.96% 67.30 13.00 158.07 50 79% 44 70%
2002 63 0.96% 89.25 6.33 172.94 42 67% 42 67%
Total 6,548   100.00% 4732 72% 2280 35% 410 6% 1683 26%
24.18 6.29 28.85 165 78% 98 47% 21 21% 43 24%
IPO 
Year









January 1st of  Event Year
End of Sample Period 
in Calendar Year
Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 (January 1st, 2007)
Median Values Across 
IPO cohorts26 
 
Table 2. Conditional acquisition rate by cohort  
IPOs are identified using the SDC Global Issues Database. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, and excludes reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisition deals of the IPO firms include all acquisitions in the SDC M&A database for 1981-2006. Event year refers to the deal 
year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions in a year divided by the number of firms alive at the beginning of that 
year. Firms' delisting information is obtained from the CRSP database. 
    
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1975 5 18 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.217 0.000
1976 32 68 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.67 0.11 0.33 0.67 0.22 0.67 0.44 1.13 0.57 0.60 0.00 0.316 0.222
1977 22 80 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.83 1.17 0.40 1.20 0.20 0.60 1.20 0.40 2.00 1.20 0.80 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.33 0.590 0.414
1978 28 81 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.55 0.16 0.11 0.28 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.00 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.33 0.75 0.25 0.57 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.286 0.250
1979 52 200 0.06 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.38 0.46 0.52 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.44 0.69 0.93 0.38 0.08 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.388 0.392
1980 99 286 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.43 0.23 0.26 0.47 0.33 0.59 0.63 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.41 0.63 0.50 0.315 0.257
1981 236 750 0.02 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.60 0.59 0.63 0.50 0.33 0.36 0.62 0.68 0.83 0.72 0.357 0.319
1982 82 225 0.04 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.09 0.15 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.24 0.31 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.28 0.50 0.44 0.53 0.14 0.257 0.266
1983 477 1,383 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.38 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.60 0.55 0.41 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.30 0.298 0.289
1984 218 769 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.51 0.70 0.49 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.65 0.53 0.70 1.06 0.66 0.82 0.467 0.486
1985 212 564 0.03 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.29 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.63 0.58 0.72 0.312 0.294
1986 451 2,228 0.06 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.45 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.89 0.67 0.46 0.43 0.64 0.55 0.99 1.20 0.517 0.491
1987 315 1,186 0.06 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.69 0.34 0.53 0.37 0.32 0.46 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.379 0.363
1988 134 557 0.06 0.42 0.32 0.32 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.62 0.46 0.58 0.27 0.39 0.36 0.49 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.375 0.364
1989 117 685 0.13 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.83 0.552 0.544
1990 103 678 0.51 0.88 0.76 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.65 0.54 0.63 0.81 1.02 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.80 0.73 1.00 0.624 0.625
1991 225 1,250 0.18 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.72 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.42 0.44 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.488 0.483
1992 295 1,834 0.37 0.79 0.73 0.62 0.785 0.70 0.63 0.73 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.71 0.55 0.596 0.619
1993 434 2,082 0.29 0.72 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.60 0.481 0.501
1994 359 1,991 0.35 0.96 1.02 0.88 0.87 0.55 0.47 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.50 0.36 0.59 0.589 0.496
1995 431 2,006 0.39 1.27 1.02 0.74 0.47 0.37 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.49 0.518 0.392
1996 641 3,093 0.58 1.41 1.06 0.68 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.55 0.45 0.609 0.484
1997 426 2,226 0.71 1.87 1.03 0.49 0.32 0.34 0.45 0.48 0.66 0.57 0.691 0.530
1998 269 1,535 1.13 1.62 0.83 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.76 0.61 0.73 0.816 0.731
1999 432 1,615 0.68 1.35 0.46 0.32 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.65 0.613 0.549
2000 327 707 0.48 0.52 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.371 0.317
2001 63 202 0.25 0.79 0.77 0.66 0.54 0.44 0.575 0.596
2002 63 177 0.30 0.54 0.66 0.94 0.76 0.641 0.655
Total 6,548 28,476
0.31 0.69 0.52 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.59 0.63 0.44 0.59 0.45 0.44 0.28
0.27 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.33 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.44 0.59 0.50 0.55 0.33
22 23 24 25 26 26 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
Median conditional acquisition 
rate for event year
Mean conditional acquisition 
rate for event year
Number of IPO cohorts
Event year Median conditional 
acquisition rate of 
cohort
Mean conditional 
acquisition rate of 
cohort IPO Year
Total  # 
of IPOs
Total # of 
deals27 
 
Table 3.  Conditional dollar acquisition rate 
IPOs are identified using the SDC Global Issues Database. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002 and excludes reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms include all acquisitions in the SDC M&A database for 1981-2006. Event year refers to the year with 
respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional dollar acquisition rate is the ratio of the total consideration paid by all firms in an IPO cohort for all their deals during the 
event year divided the total assets of the firms in that cohort at the beginning of the event year. Firms with missing transaction values are excluded from both the numerator and the 
denominator. Deal size is reported by SDC as the transaction value, and the total asset value is obtained from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged database maintained by WRDS.  
 
   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1975 0.021 0.233 0.190 0.023 0.005 0.094 0.023
1976 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.018 0.061 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.006
1977 0.019 0.011 0.002 0.126 0.044 0.016 0.042 0.005 0.002 0.023 0.029 0.017
1978 0.004 0.001 0.063 0.004 0.0002 0.076 0.001 0.0001 0.242 0.004 0.039 0.004
1979 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.0003 0.106 0.002 0.020 0.0001 0.0003 0.007 0.010 0.003
1980 0.007 0.022 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.070 0.004 0.012 0.019 0.002 0.019 0.003 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.005 0.081 0.264 0.068 0.0002 0.031 0.001 0.017 0.054 0.018 0.031 0.017
1981 0.011 0.033 0.054 0.083 0.014 0.017 0.095 0.036 0.055 0.030 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.020 0.006 0.018 0.043 0.050 0.003 0.026 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.025 0.015
1982 0.166 0.020 0.086 0.086 0.052 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.016 0.012 0.044 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.044 0.027 0.0002 0.007 0.011 0.029 0.027 0.072 0.032 0.016
1983 0.036 0.007 0.021 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.034 0.046 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.006
1984 0.073 0.023 0.037 0.035 0.040 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.166 0.049 0.015 0.014 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.022 0.027 0.026 0.014
1985 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.032 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.037 0.00001 0.012 0.009 0.006
1986 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.005 0.009 0.008
1987 0.033 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.041 0.008 0.005 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.034 0.020 0.041 0.058 0.098 0.019 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.023 0.015
1988 0.008 0.076 0.023 0.013 0.039 0.019 0.064 0.021 0.042 0.098 0.158 0.011 0.004 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.064 0.037 0.021
1989 0.021 0.015 0.074 0.015 0.018 0.039 0.067 0.052 0.029 0.191 0.004 0.025 0.008 0.046 0.013 0.042 0.008 0.029 0.039 0.027
1990 0.065 0.026 0.042 0.005 0.032 0.029 0.012 0.007 0.016 0.035 0.020 0.015 0.029 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.021 0.016
1991 0.003 0.034 0.029 0.050 0.052 0.037 0.011 0.027 0.008 0.019 0.031 0.006 0.050 0.021 0.017 0.007 0.025 0.024
1992 0.003 0.014 0.013 0.045 0.026 0.023 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.047 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.016 0.012
1993 0.019 0.038 0.047 0.048 0.090 0.110 0.053 0.042 0.025 0.027 0.013 0.032 0.008 0.039 0.042 0.038
1994 0.013 0.048 0.073 0.081 0.043 0.040 0.044 0.024 0.032 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.241 0.053 0.040
1995 0.028 0.056 0.119 0.038 0.018 0.043 0.230 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.050 0.025
1996 0.015 0.055 0.069 0.064 0.062 0.031 0.032 0.018 0.028 0.012 0.020 0.037 0.031
1997 0.009 0.102 0.242 0.048 0.032 0.032 0.014 0.013 0.073 0.013 0.058 0.032
1998 0.035 0.077 0.175 0.055 0.052 0.021 0.026 0.024 0.074 0.060 0.052
1999 0.073 0.145 0.022 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.034 0.008
2000 0.025 0.034 0.012 0.021 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.016 0.012
2001 0.0001 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.003
2002 0.033 0.027 0.053 0.045 0.232 0.078 0.045
Mean conditional 
dollar acquisition rate 
for event year
0.025 0.044 0.050 0.033 0.037 0.023 0.035 0.017 0.024 0.027 0.021 0.019 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.021 0.012 0.028 0.043 0.044 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.014
Median conditional 
dollar acquisition rate 
for event year
0.019 0.033 0.026 0.028 0.023 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.016 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.002 0.017 0.005 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.013
Number of IPO 
cohorts
21 23 24 24 26 25 24 20 21 21 18 18 16 17 17 16 13 14 9 12 11 9 7 5 5 4
Median conditional 
dollar acquisition 
rate of  cohort
Mean conditional 
dollar acquisition 




Table 4. Conditional acquisition rate of young versus mature firms.    
IPO data and acquisition deals are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-
2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO 
firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisitions announced in 1981-2006. Event year refers to the 
year relative to the IPO year, which is event year 0. The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral following Helwege and 
Liang (2004). The merger/IPO boom denotes the period from 1995 to 2000. IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return 
(P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO offer price (e.g. 
Dunbar and Foerster, 2008).  The IPO underpricing quintiles are obtained using the sub-sample of 6,518 IPOs (out of 6,548) for 
which we have data. The method of payment is reported by SDC for deals that are classified as having disclosed the details of the 
transactions. The target’s organizational form is classified using the data available in SDC into private, public, subsidiary, and 
unknown. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The tests of means use 











Young Mature Young Mature
Event years 1-3 10-20 1-3 10-20
Total number of acquisitions 11,378 5,247 11,378 5,247
Total number of completed acquisitions  for which the buyer had less (more) than 50% of the 
target before (after) the deal 7,974 3,683
Mean [Firms alive as of January 1st of event year] 6,251 923 6,251 923





IPO year --Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Hot 0.57 0.47 1.00 0.41 0.36 0.55
[2] Cold 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.29
Neutral 0.54 0.51 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.04
Test of means: [1]-[2] 0.72 0.54 0.54 0.66
IPO return quintiles --(IPO cohort) Mean conditional acquisition rate
1 0.52 0.34 2.12
b 0.38 0.23 2.08
b
2 0.51 0.47 0.57 0.36 0.32 0.57
3 0.49 0.35 1.55 0.34 0.23 1.68
c
4 0.55 0.64 -0.67 0.38 0.43 -0.44
5 0.52 0.51 0.11 0.36 0.34 0.25
Test of means:[1]-[5] 0.06 -2.47
b 0.20 -2.28
b
Acquisition year --Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Merger/IPO boom 1995-2000 0.99 0.57 3.70
a 0.70 0.38 4.07
a
[2] Other 0.41 0.45 -0.78 0.29 0.34 -0.83
Test of means: [1]-[2] 5.42
a 1.61 5.12
a 0.94
Relatedness--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Not in the same 2-digit SIC 0.20 0.21 -0.28 0.14 0.14 -0.32
[2] In the same 2-digit SIC 0.32 0.26 1.28 0.23 0.18 1.28
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] -0.97 -0.38 -0.85 -0.35
Target's status--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Private 0.33 0.25 1.47 0.24 0.19 1.24
[2] Public 0.04 0.05 -2.39
b 0.02 0.03 -2.64
b
[3] Subsidiary 0.14 0.15 -0.37 0.10 0.10 -0.01





Test of proportions: [1]-[3] 1.59 0.85 1.26 0.79
Test of proportions: [2]-[3] -1.30 -1.06 -1.21 -0.95
Method of payment--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Cash 0.13 0.15 -0.73 0.10 0.11 -0.39
[2] Stock 0.06 0.04 1.96
c 0.05 0.03 2.00
c
Both 0.03 0.02 1.86
c 0.02 0.01 1.63
Unknown 0.30 0.26 0.82 0.20 0.18 0.65
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 0.83 1.23 0.69 1.00
Relatedness--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Not in the same 2-digit SIC 0.41 0.45 -1.01 0.40 0.44 -0.80
[2] In the same 2-digit SIC 0.59 0.55 1.01 0.60 0.56 0.80
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] -1.23 -0.71 -1.33 -0.84
Target's status--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Private 0.61 0.54 2.55
a 0.62 0.57 1.82
c
[2] Public 0.10 0.12 -1.25 0.07 0.10 -2.77
a
[3] Subsidiary 0.27 0.33 -2.44
b 0.29 0.32 -1.22





Test of proportions: [1]-[3] 2.36
b 1.36 2.31
b 1.62





Method of payment--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Cash 0.24 0.33 -3.02
a 0.24 0.33 -2.92
a
[2] Stock 0.11 0.09 1.44 0.12 0.10 1.30
Both 0.04 0.03 1.04 0.04 0.04 0.47
Unknown 0.61 0.55 1.48 0.59 0.53 1.48
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 1.20 1.94
b 1.02 1.79
c
All acquisitions Completed acquisitions30 
 
Table 5. Conditional dollar acquisition rates of young versus mature firms.  
IPO data and acquisition deals are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-
2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO 
firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisition deals announced in 1981-2006. Event year refers to 
year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional dollar acquisition rate is the ratio of all considerations paid for 
acquisitions of a given type in a year divided by the total assets of the firms alive at the beginning of that year. The transaction 
size ratio is the dollar value of acquisitions with a given characteristics divided by the dollar amount of acquisitions. Acquisition 
size is reported by SDC as the transaction value, and the total asset value is obtained from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged 
database maintained by WRDS.  The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral following Helwege and Liang (2004). The 
merger/IPO boom denotes the period from 1995 to 2000. IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, 
where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO offer price (e.g. Dunbar and 
Foerster, 2008).  The IPO underpricing quintiles are obtained using the sub-sample of 6,518 IPOs (out of 6,548) for which we 
have  data.  The  method  of  payment  is  reported  by  SDC  for  deals  that  are  classified  as  having  disclosed  the  details  of  the 
transactions. The target’s organizational form is classified using the data available in SDC into private, public, subsidiary, and 
unknown. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The tests of means use 











Young Mature Young Mature
1-3 10-20 1-3 10-20
Total number of deals 11,378 5,247
Total number of  acquisitions (excluding  all deals by firms with at least one missing transaction value) 3,896 1,611 3,896 1,611
Percent of  deals (excluding  all deals by firms with at least one missing transaction value) 34% 31%
Total number of  completed deals where percent owned after (before) the deals is less (more) than 50%, 
excluding  all deals of firms with at least one missing transaction value 2,913 1,151
Percent of  completed deals where percent owned after (before) the deals is less (more) than 50%, 
excluding  all deals of firms with at least one missing transaction value 75% 71%
Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate 0.04 0.03 1.44 0.04 0.02 2.17
b
IPO year--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
[1] Hot 0.06 0.04 1.26 0.07 0.03 2.09
c
[2] Cold 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08
Neutral 0.03 0.02 2.15
b 0.04 0.02 1.70
Test of means:  [1]-[2] 2.10
b 1.00 2.02
c 0.08
IPO return quintiles (IPO cohort)--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
1 0.05 0.02 3.62
a 0.05 0.02 2.91
a
2 0.04 0.03 0.92 0.05 0.02 2.60
b
3 0.03 0.02 1.37 0.03 0.02 1.42
4 0.05 0.03 1.76
c 0.06 0.03 1.52
5 0.08 0.16 -0.61 0.09 0.16 -0.52
Test of means: [1]-[5] -1.56 -1.02 -1.43 -1.07
Acquisition year--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
[1] Merger/IPO boom 1995-2000  0.08 0.03 3.25
a 0.12 0.04 2.16
c
[2] Other 0.03 0.02 1.02 0.03 0.02 1.36




Relatedness--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
[1] Not in the same 2-digit SIC 0.01 0.01 -0.72 0.01 0.01 -0.18
[2] In the same 2-digit SIC 0.03 0.02 2.19
b 0.03 0.01 2.50
b
Test of proportions:  [1]-[2] -0.49 -0.04 -0.58 -0.12
Target's status--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
[1] Private 0.01 0.003 4.00
a 0.01 0.003 2.90
a
[2] Public 0.02 0.02 0.80 0.02 0.01 1.36
[3] Subsidiary 0.01 0.01 -0.27 0.01 0.01 0.33
Test of proportions:  [1]-[2] -0.24 -0.41 -0.15 -0.31
Test of proportions:  [1]-[3] 0.05 -0.32 0.07 -0.26
Test of proportions:  [2]-[3] 0.28 0.10 0.22 0.05
Method of payment--Mean conditional dollar acquisition rate
[1] Cash 0.01 0.02 -0.48 0.01 0.01 0.33
[2] Stock 0.01 0.01 -1.12 0.02 0.01 1.19
Both 0.002 0.003 1.27 0.003 0.003 -0.25
Unknown 0.02 0.003 2.94
a 0.01 0.003 2.74
b
Test of proportions:  [1]-[2] -1.13 0.20 -0.21 -0.02
Relatedness--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Not in the same 2-Digit SIC 0.34 0.39 -0.76 0.35 0.40 -0.74
[2] In the same 2-Digit SIC 0.66 0.61 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.74
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] -2.21
b -1.51 -2.10
b -1.35
Target's status--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Private 0.33 0.27 1.64 0.37 0.31 1.18
[2] Public 0.32 0.39 -1.22 0.28 0.37 -1.70
c
[3] Subsidiary 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.33 0.31 0.38
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 0.04 -0.82 0.61 -0.42
Test of proportions: [1]-[3] 0.02 -0.32 0.26 0.01
Test of proportions: [2]-[3] -0.02 0.50 -0.35 0.43
Method of payment--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Cash 0.33 0.54 -3.55
a 0.36 0.51 -2.39
b
[2] Stock 0.28 0.23 0.89 0.25 0.24 0.23
Both 0.33 0.13 -1.54 0.06 0.10 -1.59
Unknown 0.07 0.10 3.18
a 0.33 0.15 2.73
a
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 0.41 1.96
b 0.86 1.87
c
Completed acquisitions All acquisitions32 
 
Table 6. OLS regressions for conditional acquisition rate of IPO cohorts during 1975-2002 
This  table  presents  the  regression  coefficients  for  OLS  regression  models  where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  conditional 
acquisition rate for IPO cohorts in an event year. Observations where there are less than 20 firms alive for the IPO cohort are 
excluded. The merger/IPO boom denotes the period from 1995 to 2000. M&A index is constructed by dividing the total number 
of acquisitions in SDC by the  number of active  firms in Compustat. The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral 
following Helwege and Liang (2004). IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day 
closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO offer price (e.g. Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). Robust 
standard errors with clustering on IPO-cohort are reported below the coefficient estimates. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable is conditional acquisition rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)







            0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05





            0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-
2000)






                   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11
M&A indext  0.22
a
0.05
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1)               0.15
                          0.09
Merger/IPO boomt-1        0.04 0.03
                   0.03 0.02
IPO cohort went public in HOT periods (Yes=1) 0.05        0.04
            0.07        0.07
IPO cohort went public in COLD periods (Yes=1)        0.003        -0.005
                   0.07        0.07
Mean  (IPO cohort's first day return)               0.001 0.001
              0.002 0.001
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) * Deal is 
within 1-3 years after IPO (Yes=1)  0.27
a
0.07
Above average M&A Indext (Yes=1) * Deal is 
within 4-9 years after IPO (Yes=1) -0.03
0.13
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) * Deal is more 
than 9 years from IPO (Yes=1) -0.20
c
0.1
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-
2000) * Deal is within 1-3 years after IPO (Yes=1) 0.34
a
0.1
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-
2000)* Deal is within 4-9 years after IPO (Yes=1) -0.05
0.12
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-













            0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.05
R-squared 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.34
Number of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Number of observations 391 391 391 391 369 369 391 39133 
 
Table 7. OLS regressions for conditional dollar acquisition rate of IPO cohorts during 1975-2002 
This table presents the regression coefficients for OLS regression models where the dependent variable is the conditional dollar 
acquisition rate for IPO cohorts in an event year. Observations where there are less than 20 firms alive for the IPO cohort are 
excluded. The merger/IPO boom denotes the period from 1995 to 2000. M&A index is constructed by dividing the total number 
of acquisitions in SDC by the  number of active  firms in Compustat. The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral 
following Helwege and Liang (2004). IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day 
closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO offer price (e.g. Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). Robust 
standard errors with clustering on IPO-cohort are reported below the coefficient estimates. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  level, respectively. 
 
 
   
Dependent variable is conditional dollar acquisition rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)







            0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004








            0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.010








Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) 0.009
            0.008
Merger/IPO boomt-1                        0.019
b 0.019
b
                                 0.007 0.007
IPO cohort went public in HOT periods (Yes=1) -0.005        -0.005
            0.005        0.006
IPO cohort went public in COLD periods (Yes=1) -0.006        -0.007
c
            0.004        0.004
Mean (IPO cohort's first day return)        0.0001 0.0001
                   0.0002 0.0002
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) * Deal is within 1-3 years 
after IPO (Yes=1) 0.030
b
0.010
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) * Deal is within 4-9 years 
after IPO (Yes=1) -0.010
0.010
Above average M&A indext (Yes=1) * Deal is more than 9 
years from IPO (Yes=1) -0.010
0.010
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-2000) * Deal is 
within 1-3 years after IPO (Yes=1) 0.050
a
0.010
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-2000)* Deal is 
within 4-9 years after IPO (Yes=1) 0.010
0.010
Merger/IPO boomt  (Yes=1 if deals are in 1995-2000)* Deal is 











            0.005 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.004
R-squared 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.14
Number of groups 27 27 27 27 26 26 27 27
Number of observations 382 382 382 382 357 357 382 38234 
 
Table 8. Conditional acquisition rate for the first four years after the IPO and for the IPO year 
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, 
excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms 
are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisitions announced in 1981-2006. Event year refers to the year 
with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions of a given type in a year 
divided by the number of firms alive at the beginning of that year. The acquisition frequency is the fraction of acquisitions that 
have  some  characteristic.  The  IPO  market  is  classified  as  hot,  cold,  or  neutral  following  Helwege  and  Liang  (2004).  The 
merger/IPO boom denotes the period from 1995 to 2000. IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, 
where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO offer price (e.g. Dunbar and 
Foerster, 2008).  The IPO underpricing quintiles are obtained using the sub-sample of 6,518 IPOs (out of 6,548) for which we 
have  data.  The  method  of  payment  is  reported  by  SDC  for  deals  that  are  classified  as  having  disclosed  the  details  of  the 
transactions. We also provide data on acquisitions for which SDC provides no details on the method of payment. The target’s 
organizational form is classified using the data available in SDC into private, public, subsidiary, and unknown. We use t-statistics 
to test for differences in mean acquisition rates and a z-statistic for differences in fractions. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  level, respectively. The superscript 
d denotes subsamples with less than 10 IPO cohorts. 35 
 
 





0 1 2 3 4 1-4 0 1 2 3 4 1-4
Number of acquisitions 2,264 5,016 3,644 2,718 2,212
Number of completed acquisitions where percent owned before (after) 
the acquisitions is less (more) than 50%
1,633 3,490 2,517 1,967 1,601
Firms alive as of January 1st 6,548 6,374 6,343 6,035 5,389 6,548 6,374 6,343 6,035 5,389
Mean conditional acquisition rate 0.31 0.69 0.52 0.41 0.39 2.58
b 0.22 0.48 0.36 0.30 0.28 2.46
b
IPO year--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Hot 0.33 0.77 0.54 0.41 0.40 2.08
b 0.24 0.54 0.38 0.30 0.29 1.95
c
[2] Cold 0.21 0.63 0.47 0.36 0.35 1.43 0.18
d 0.47 0.34 0.27 0.24 1.54
Neutral 0.36 0.64 0.54 0.42 0.42 1.74
c 0.26 0.42 0.35 0.29 0.30 1.31
Test of means:  [1]-[2] 1.44 0.58 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.76 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.59
IPO return quintiles (IPO cohort)--Mean conditional acquisition rate
1 0.31 0.63 0.52 0.49 0.45 1.51 0.21 0.46 0.37 0.35 0.32 1.39
2 0.32 0.71 0.50 0.40 0.36 2.78
a 0.23 0.50 0.35 0.29 0.26 2.50
b
3 0.31 0.68 0.46 0.39 0.33 2.79
a 0.20 0.49 0.32 0.27 0.22 2.90
a
4 0.35 0.71 0.60 0.40 0.42 2.02
b 0.26 0.48 0.41 0.32 0.33 1.66
5 0.28 0.73 0.51 0.39 0.37 2.34
b 0.21 0.50 0.36 0.27 0.25 2.15
b
Test of means: [1]-[5] 0.34 -0.60 0.10 0.87 0.73 0.01 -0.30 0.18 0.80 0.77
Acquisition year--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Merger/IPO boom 1995-2000 0.66 1.41 0.93 0.67 0.65 8.02
a 0.48 0.98 0.63 0.49 0.46 6.23
a
[2] Other 0.19 0.44 0.38 0.35 0.31 1.61 0.13 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.22 1.33











Relatedness--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Not in the same 2-digit SIC 0.10 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.16 2.12
b 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 2.15
b
[2] In the same 2-digit SIC 0.21 0.44 0.31 0.25 0.23 2.76
a 0.15 0.31 0.22 0.18 0.17 2.55
b
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] -0.96 -1.37 -0.85 -0.74 -0.60 -0.81 -1.11 -0.77 -0.67 -0.68
Target's status--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Private 0.21 0.46 0.33 0.25 0.22 2.72
a 0.15 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.16 2.64
b
[2] Public 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.38 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.67
[3] Subsidiary 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.12 2.05
b 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 1.98
c











Test of proportions:  [1]-[3] 1.88 2.06
b 1.53 1.16 0.94 0.99 1.62 1.20 0.93 0.84
Test of proportions:  [2]-[3] -1.07 -1.48 -1.25 -1.16 -1.00 -0.94 -1.35 -1.18 -1.12 -0.93
Method of payment--Mean conditional acquisition rate
[1] Cash 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11 2.09
b 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 2.22
b
[2] Stock 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 1.38 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 1.23
Both 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 2.50
b 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.34
b
Unknown 0.19 0.40 0.30 0.24 0.22 2.65
a 0.12 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.15 2.53
b
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 0.66 0.95 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.53 0.78 0.62 0.65 0.57
Relatedness--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Not in the same 2-digit SIC 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.44 -1.42 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.00
[2] In the same 2-digit SIC 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.56 1.42 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.00
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] -1.39 -1.47 -1.07 -1.31 -0.83 -1.53 -1.75
c -1.19 -1.36 -1.86
c
Target's status--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Private 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.51 2.88
a 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.51 2.35
b
[2] Public 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 -2.80
a 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 -2.41
b
[3] Subsidiary 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.32 -1.51 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.32 -0.70




















Test of proportions: [2]-[3] -1.65
c -1.72





Method of payment--Mean [Fraction of acquisitions]
[1] Cash 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 -0.45 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.22
[2] Stock 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.12 -1.10 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.14 -1.17
Both 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.62 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.63
Unknown 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.73 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.34
Test of proportions: [1]-[2] 1.57 1.34 1.20 0.95 1.20 1.59 1.37 1.18 0.55 0.92
 All acquisitions Completed acquisitions
Event year Event year36 
 
Table 9. Conditional acquisition rate of firms relative to their IPO for each of the quintiles of age since incorporation 
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum.  IPO founding dates are compiled from SDC Platinum and Professor 
Jay Ritter's website. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002 with founding dates, excluding reverse 
LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using 
the SDC M&A database and include all acquisitions announced in 1981-2006. Event year refers to the year with respect to the 
IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions of a given type in a year divided by the number 
of firms alive at the beginning of that year. The acquisition frequency is the fraction of acquisitions that have some characteristic. 
The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral following Helwege and Liang (2004). The merger/IPO boom denotes the 
period from 1995 to 2000. IPO age is calculated as the number of years passed from the founding date relative to the IPO year. he 
IPO age quintiles are obtained using the sub-sample of 6,301 IPOs (out of 6,518) for which we have data. We use t-statistics to 
test for differences in mean acquisition rates and a z-statistic for differences in fractions. The superscripts 
a,b,c  denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  level, respectively. The superscript 
d denotes subsamples with less than 10 IPO cohorts. 
Panel A. IPO age 
1 1,312 1.70 2 1.35
2 1,257 4.35 4 1.42
3 1,262 7.51 7 2.49
4 1,258 14.39 13 6.36
5 1,212 46.78 39 26.91






Event years 1-3 10-20
Total number of acquisitions 10,820 5,258
Total number of completed acquisitions  for which the buyer had less (more) 
than 50% of the target before (after) the deal
7,627 3,509
Mean [Firms alive as of January 1st of event year] 6,009 1,012
Mean conditional acquisition rate 0.41 0.40 0.22
IPO age quintiles --(IPO cohort) Mean conditional acquisition rate
1 0.41 0.28 1.74
c
2 0.39 0.40 -0.07
3 0.37 0.38 -0.16
4 0.37 0.33 0.58
5 0.44 0.36 0.88
Test of means: [1]-[5] -0.28 -1.18
Test of 
means  
0 1 2 3 4 1-4
Number of acquisitions  2,151 4,768 3,487 2,565 2,110
Number of completed acquisitions where percent owned before (after) the 
acquisitions is less (more) than 50%
1,562 3,342 2,412 1,873 1,529
Firms alive as of January 1st 6,301 6,119 6,094 5,814 5,064
Mean conditional acquisition rate 0.25 0.52 0.39 0.33 0.30 2.58
b
IPO Age quintiles (IPO cohort)--Mean conditional acquisition rate
1 0.29 0.53 0.39 0.32 0.27 2.22
b
2 0.22 0.46 0.40 0.31 0.28 2.06
b
3 0.19 0.48 0.34 0.30 0.30 1.95
c
4 0.22 0.44 0.36 0.32 0.31 1.52
5 0.24 0.53 0.42 0.37 0.23 2.79
a
Test of means: [1]-[5] 0.56 0.00 -0.41 -0.54 0.66
Std. dev.
Panel B. Conditional acquisition rate of young versus mature firms.




IPO age quintiles Total # of 
IPOs
Mean  Median 37 
 
 
Table 10.  Cumulative abnormal returns around acquisition announcements by young and mature firms conditional on the method of payment and organizational form 
of the target 
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisitions announced in 1981-2006. 
Event year refers to the deal year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. Method of payment is reported by SDC for deals that are classified as having disclosed the details of 
the transactions. We also provide data on acquisition and deals rates for deals which SDC classified as ‘undisclosed’ and provided no details of the method of payment. Target’s 
organizational form is classified using the data available in SDC into private, public, subsidiary, and unknown. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated using the event 
window  of  [-1,+1].  Abnormal  returns  are  calculated  net  of  equally-weighted  market  portfolio.  Rows  have  mean,  median,  standard  deviation,  and  number  of  observations 
respectively. We use t-statistics to test for differences in mean CARs and a z-statistic for the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test of differences in median CARs. We use 
superscripts 
a, b, c to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
   
Difference tests Difference tests Difference tests Difference tests
Young Mature t-statistic Young Mature t-statistic Young Mature t-statistic Young Mature t-statistic





















0.12 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.13



















0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.10
























0.11 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.10
































































0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.11
11,764 4,904 4,853 2,142 2,793 1,534 1,441 450
All acquisitions 
All disclosed acquisitions with data on the method 
of payment




Event years Target's 
organizational 
form
































Difference tests Difference tests Difference tests Difference tests








Total Total Total38 
 
Table 11.  Cumulative abnormal returns around  acquisition announcements  by young and  mature firms conditional  on relatedness, the  method of  payment  and 
organizational form of the target  
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisitions announced in 1981-2006. 
Event year refers to the year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. Method of payment is reported by SDC for acquisitions that are classified as having disclosed the details of 
the transactions. We also provide data on acquisitions for which SDC provides no details on the method of payment. The target’s organizational form is classified using the data 
available in SDC into private, public, subsidiary, and unknown. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated using the event window of [-1,0,+1]. Abnormal returns are 
calculated net of equally-weighted market portfolio. Rows have mean,  median, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  We use t-statistics to test for 
differences in mean CARs and a z-statistic for the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test of differences in median CARs. We use superscripts 
a,  b,  c to denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
[a]-[b] [c]-[d] [c]-[a] [d]-[b] [e]-[f] [g]-[h] [g]-[e] [h]-[f]
Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature
1-3  10-20 1-3  10-20 t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 1-3  10-20 1-3  10-20 t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic













b [0.59] [0.74] [1.30] [0.89] 1.05%
a -0.53% 1.25%
a 0.63% [1.46] [1.32] [1.01] [0.94]
0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.16
879 362 526 289 625 108 365 120
0.79% 0.12% 2.02%
b 0.14% 0.87 1.87
c 1.10 0.03 -3.8%
a -2.82%




a 0.29% [0.68] [1.93]
b [1.33] [0.79] -4.14%
a -1.91%
a -2.13%
c 0.22% [-1.38] [-1.13] [1.92]
c [2.07]
b
0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.10






b 1.09 0.06 0.75 4.06%
c 5.69%
b 9.43%








a [1.00] [-0.06] [1.00] 1.11% 2.97%
a 1.67%
c 0.34% [-1.49] [1.38] [0.73] [-1.95]
b
0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.10 0.34 0.08
794 380 380 200 87 20 49 13




[0.29] [1.11] [-0.82] [0.73] [6.55] [2.91]
a [3.36] [0.92]
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Event years Event years Event years Event years39 
 
Figure 1. Post-IPO conditional acquisition rate per event-year by IPO-cohort 
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisition deals announced in 1981-
2006. Event year refers to the year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions of a given type in a year divided by the 


















































































Figure 2. Post-IPO median value of the event-year conditional acquisition rate by the state of the IPO market and of the M&A market  
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisition deals announced in 1981-
2006. Event year refers to the year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions of a given type in a year divided by the 
number of firms alive at the beginning of that year. The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral following Helwege and Liang (2004). The merger/IPO boom period is 
during 1995-2000. IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO 
offer price (e.g. Dunbar and Foerster, 2008). The IPO underpricing quintiles are obtained using the 6,518 IPOs (out of 6,548) for which we have data.  

















































Not in the 
merger/IPO boom41 
 
Figure 3. Post-IPO mean value of the event-year conditional acquisition rate by the state of the IPO market and of the M&A market  
IPO and acquisition data are obtained from the SDC Platinum. The IPO sample includes all initial public offerings in 1975-2002, excluding reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights and unit 
offerings, ADRs, closed-end funds, and REITs. Acquisitions of the IPO firms are identified using the SDC M&A database and include all acquisition deals announced in 1981-
2006. Event year refers to the year with respect to the IPO year, event year 0. The conditional acquisition rate is the ratio of acquisitions of a given type in a year divided by the 
number of firms alive at the beginning of that year. The IPO market is classified as hot, cold, or neutral following Helwege and Liang (2004). The merger/IPO boom period is 
during 1995-2000. IPO underpricing is calculated as the initial return (P1-P0)*100/P0, where P1 is the first-day closing stock price or bid-ask average (from CRSP) and P0 is the IPO 
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